The global container shipping industry’s cautious return to the Suez Canal has been hit by a fresh security shock.
On August 11, a small cargo ship was attacked in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait off Yemen, killing three crew members, according to Yemeni coast guard and military sources cited by Reuters. The vessel, Tanzania-flagged Tihamah, was reportedly attacked while at anchor near Perim Island after sailing from Salalah in Oman via Djibouti. UK Maritime Trade Operations confirmed that a cargo vessel off Al-Mokha had been hit by an unknown projectile and that there were casualties.
The timing is significant.
Just one day earlier, Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd announced that another Gemini Cooperation service would return to the Red Sea and Suez Canal after months of routing around Africa.
Maersk was only beginning the Suez return
On August 10, Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd announced the restoration of the AE19 Gemini Cooperation service to the trans-Suez route.
The service connects Asia with the Suez Canal and Port Tangier. Its first vessel under the restored routing is Berlin Maersk, a 17,480-TEU container ship built in 2025. The vessel was reported to be making its way from Malaysia when the route restoration was announced. The service also includes calls in Egypt and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
This was not a complete return to normality.
Rather, Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd were gradually testing the economics and security of the Suez corridor after an extended period in which container carriers had avoided the Red Sea because of Houthi attacks.
The carriers had already restored another Gemini service, while Maersk had separately indicated that selected services could return to the shorter Suez route if security conditions allowed.
The strategic attraction is obvious: Suez remains substantially shorter and more fuel-efficient than sending a container ship around the Cape of Good Hope.
But the August 11 attack demonstrates why carriers have been treating the return as a risk-managed experiment rather than a full reopening.
The Berlin Maersk timing matters
Berlin Maersk is particularly significant because of its size.
At 17,480 TEU, a vessel of this scale represents a major amount of container capacity being committed to the Red Sea corridor.
However, available shipping information does not support stating that Berlin Maersk had already reached Egypt and then halted there before the August 11 attack.
The August 10 report from The Maritime Executive said the vessel was still making its way from Malaysia when the AE19 restoration was announced. Therefore, the more accurate description is that Berlin Maersk was among the first vessels scheduled to demonstrate the renewed trans-Suez strategy rather than claiming that it had already completed an Egypt call.
That distinction is important because the industry is now watching whether vessels already committed to the Suez corridor will continue, pause, or revert to the Cape of Good Hope following the latest attack.
A warning arrives at the Bab el-Mandeb
The August 11 attack changes the risk calculation.
Reuters reported that an average of about 32 ships per day passed through the Bab el-Mandeb last week, compared with around 50 ships per day before the latest blockade-related disruption. That indicates that traffic had already fallen significantly before the latest casualty-producing incident.
For container carriers, the problem is not simply whether the Suez Canal itself is physically open.
The critical issue is the entire chain:
Indian Ocean → Gulf of Aden → Bab el-Mandeb → Red Sea → Suez Canal.
A vessel cannot economically use Suez if the southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb remain exposed to attack.
That is why a security deterioration at the southern entrance can effectively undermine the commercial value of the Suez route hundreds of nautical miles farther north.
Insurance is becoming the decisive factor
The insurance market had already begun pricing this risk before the August 11 attack.
Reuters reported on July 30 that the London marine insurance market had expanded the Red Sea high-risk zone after Houthi attacks on Saudi-linked vessels.
The Joint War Committee moved the Red Sea notification line northward, bringing more of the area near Saudi Arabian ports into the heightened-risk zone.
The financial effect was immediate.
Indicative war-risk premiums for Saudi ports farther north of Jizan, including Jeddah and Yanbu, rose to about 1% of vessel value from 0.25% earlier that week, according to insurance-market sources cited by Reuters.
For voyages through the southern Red Sea, premiums had already increased to approximately 1%–2% of vessel value from around 0.3% before the Houthi maritime embargo announcement.
For a large containership, even a seemingly small percentage change represents a substantial additional voyage cost.
This is where the economics of Suez versus Cape of Good Hope becomes complicated.
The Suez route saves time and bunker consumption, but the vessel owner must price in:
Additional war-risk premium
Security-related costs
Potential deviation or waiting time
Higher contingency costs
Greater exposure to cargo and hull losses
Possible disruption to subsequent port rotations
The Cape route, by contrast, increases sailing distance and fuel consumption but removes the vessel from the immediate Red Sea war-risk zone.
The insurance market is already preparing for more risk
The Joint War Committee's latest listed-area framework is particularly important.
The committee says vessels entering listed areas may require additional war-risk coverage, while the actual premium is negotiated between underwriters and brokers. Its current Red Sea assessment reflects the Houthi embargo against Saudi ports and the attacks that followed.
TT Club has also published updated war-risk exclusions based on the July 29 JWC circular, with the changes taking effect for its members on August 12. The listed area includes the Southern Red Sea and specified waters covering the Gulf of Aden and surrounding high-risk areas.
This means the insurance reaction is not merely theoretical.
The risk classification of the corridor is already changing, and the August 11 attack could add further pressure to premiums, deductibles, coverage conditions and voyage-specific underwriting.
Why the Cape of Good Hope is back on the table
The shipping industry's response to Red Sea attacks has historically been straightforward: if the risk-adjusted cost of Suez becomes too high, ships go around Africa.
Maersk itself has previously used this approach.
In March, the company announced that its ME11 and MECL services would be rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope because of deteriorating security conditions, while stating that it would prioritise the trans-Suez route again when security conditions permitted.
That earlier experience is important now.
The industry has already invested heavily in a Cape-routing operating model. Ships, schedules, bunker planning and port rotations can be adjusted to accommodate the longer route.
Therefore, the return to Suez was never irreversible.
The August 10 decision by Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd represented a calculated attempt to recover the efficiency of the shorter corridor. The August 11 attack demonstrates how quickly that calculation can change.
Not every carrier has yet announced a blanket Cape return
It would be premature to say that all shipping lines have already switched back to the Cape of Good Hope following the August 11 attack.
There is currently a more complicated picture.
Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd had just announced another Suez restoration, while other carriers have maintained different routing strategies depending on service, vessel position and security assessment.
CMA CGM, for example, has previously used the Cape of Good Hope as a contingency route during Red Sea security deteriorations, while Maersk has also repeatedly maintained contingency plans for reverting to the Cape.
The more important development to watch is therefore whether carriers begin cancelling or delaying the newly restored Suez rotations.
If that happens across multiple services, the August 11 incident could mark the beginning of another broad reversal rather than an isolated security event.
The cost of going around Africa
A renewed Cape strategy would immediately affect vessel utilisation.
The longer route means:
Longer transit times → higher bunker consumption → fewer round voyages per vessel → tighter effective capacity → higher freight costs.
LogisticsWall's earlier analysis found that continued Cape routing can add roughly 15–20 days to some Asia-Europe voyages, depending on the origin, destination and operating speed.
That additional sailing time effectively removes container capacity from the market.
A ship that previously completed a certain number of rotations through Suez may complete fewer annual rotations when routed around the Cape. Carriers therefore need more vessels to maintain the same frequency.
This is one reason why freight rates can rise even when global cargo demand has not increased significantly.
The insurance-freight connection
The latest development also reinforces a point seen repeatedly during the 2026 maritime disruptions: freight costs do not move independently of insurance costs.
When war-risk premiums increase, shipowners and carriers have several choices.
They can absorb the additional cost.
They can impose a war-risk or emergency surcharge.
They can change the route.
Or they can suspend the service until the risk becomes commercially acceptable.
LogisticsWall's earlier reporting on the Middle East crisis documented how reduced or withdrawn war-risk cover forced carriers to alter vessel routes and introduce additional surcharges.
The same mechanism is now emerging in the Red Sea.
The difference is that container carriers have a commercially viable alternative: the Cape of Good Hope.
That makes the insurance premium a critical part of the Suez-versus-Cape calculation.
Egypt faces another threat to Suez traffic
The development is also significant for Egypt.
Every container ship that chooses the Cape instead of Suez represents lost canal revenue and weaker activity across the wider Suez maritime ecosystem.
This is particularly important because the Suez Canal was only beginning to see signs of a cautious recovery after years of reduced Red Sea traffic.
The return of Gemini services offered a potential signal that carriers were gradually regaining confidence.
The latest attack threatens that recovery before it has fully taken hold.
What happens next
The next few days will be more important than the announcement itself.
Shipping companies will monitor:
Whether more attacks occur in the Bab el-Mandeb.
Whether container ships continue entering the southern Red Sea.
Whether Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd maintain the newly restored AE19 routing.
Whether other carriers suspend planned Suez rotations.
How war-risk underwriters revise premiums after the latest casualty-producing attack.
Whether freight surcharges increase on Asia-Europe services.
The key question is no longer whether the Suez Canal is open.
It is whether the insurance and security cost of reaching Suez is low enough for carriers to justify using it.
The LogisticsWall view
The August 11 attack exposes the fragility of the shipping industry's Suez comeback.
Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd were only beginning to restore another major Gemini service to the Suez corridor when a fresh attack in the Bab el-Mandeb killed crew members.
The sequence is significant: Suez returns when security appears manageable; insurance premiums rise when attacks resume; carriers then reassess whether the shorter route is still worth the risk.
For cargo owners, the immediate consequence may not be a sudden closure of Suez. The bigger risk is another prolonged period of route uncertainty, where vessels are alternately scheduled through Suez and the Cape depending on security assessments.
For insurers, the latest attack reinforces the case for higher war-risk pricing.
For carriers, it puts the economics of the Suez comeback back under pressure.
And for global trade, it is another reminder that a shipping corridor can be technically open but commercially unusable when security, insurance and operational risk become too expensive.
The Suez Canal may be open. The question is whether shipping lines can afford to trust it.
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