Jebel Ali faces a 90–95% volume shock: how the Hormuz crisis could reshape DP World

DP World's Jebel Ali Port entered 2026 after a record year, but the Strait of Hormuz crisis has transformed the economics of the UAE's biggest container gateway. With vessel traffic collapsing, alternative ports gaining importance and DP World planning new east-coast capacity, the disruption could become more than a temporary volume loss.

Jebel Ali is facing one of the most severe operational shocks in its history.

The port handled approximately 15.6 million TEUs in 2025, but reports indicate that container activity at the gateway subsequently fell by around 90–95% after the Strait of Hormuz was disrupted by the regional conflict. The collapse is not primarily the result of physical destruction at Jebel Ali. DP World has said the port remains operational, while the sharp reduction in vessel traffic is being caused by the security situation around the Strait.

That distinction is critical.

Jebel Ali's problem is not that its cranes or berths have stopped working. The problem is that ships are no longer able or willing to reach the port at anything close to normal frequency.

From record growth to an unprecedented shock

The timing could hardly be more dramatic.

In 2024, Jebel Ali handled 15.5 million TEUs, its highest container volume since 2015. Volumes increased by roughly one million TEUs from the previous year.

In 2025, the port handled approximately 15.6 million TEUs, maintaining that record level. DP World's global business also delivered a record financial performance.

Group revenue increased 22% to $24.4 billion, adjusted EBITDA increased 18% to $6.4 billion, and profit for the year increased 32.2% to $1.96 billion. Global gross container throughput increased 5.8% to 93.4 million TEUs.

Jebel Ali therefore entered 2026 from a position of strength.

Then the operating environment changed almost overnight.

What does a 90–95% fall actually mean?

A 90–95% decline should not be interpreted as a forecast for the whole of 2026 unless the disruption lasts for the entire year.

But the scale becomes clearer when applied to Jebel Ali's 2025 throughput.

If the port's annualised volume were to remain 90% below the 2025 level, the implied throughput would fall from around 15.6 million TEUs to only about 1.56 million TEUs.

At a 95% decline, the equivalent annualised volume would be approximately 780,000 TEUs.

That represents an implied loss of roughly 14.0–14.8 million TEUs of annual handling capacity/volume compared with the 2025 baseline.

This is an illustration, not a forecast. Actual 2026 throughput will depend on how long the disruption continues and how much cargo is rerouted through alternative gateways.

The financial exposure is much larger than container handling fees

It would be wrong to multiply the lost TEUs by a simple terminal-handling charge and call the result DP World's financial loss.

Jebel Ali is part of a much larger ecosystem involving terminal handling, transshipment, warehousing, trucking, freight forwarding, free-zone activity, storage, marine services and re-export trade.

DP World reported $24.4 billion of group revenue in 2025, but Jebel Ali's contribution cannot be isolated directly from the published group accounts.

Nevertheless, the earnings risk is already visible.

Moody's has estimated that DP World's earnings could decline from around $6.6 billion in 2025 to $5.9 billion in 2026, implying approximately $700 million of lost earnings, or about 10.6%. The estimate reflects the broader impact of the conflict rather than a standalone Jebel Ali loss.

This is therefore best understood as the current external estimate of group-level earnings damage, not a reported Jebel Ali loss.

There was damage—but the major loss is disruption

Missile and drone activity has nevertheless created direct physical and safety risks.

Early in the conflict, debris from an intercepted missile led to a fire at Jebel Ali, and operations were temporarily suspended as a precaution. Reports subsequently indicated that the port itself had not suffered material infrastructure damage.

That makes the economic impact particularly significant.

A terminal can remain technically operational but still lose most of its business if shipping lines cannot safely call there.

For a port operator, this creates a dangerous combination:

Lower vessel calls + lower container throughput + lower transshipment activity + lower ancillary logistics revenue + higher security and contingency costs.

Where is the cargo going?

The immediate beneficiaries are alternative gateways that can provide access to the UAE and wider Gulf without depending entirely on the same maritime route.

Khorfakkan

Khorfakkan has become one of the most important alternatives.

Gulftainer's Khorfakkan Container Terminal has 5 million TEUs of stated annual capacity, six berths and 18 quay cranes.

The terminal is outside the Strait of Hormuz on the Gulf of Oman and can therefore provide an alternative maritime gateway.

The shift is already visible in carrier operations. Maersk has been offering landbridge solutions from Khor Fakkan and Fujairah into the UAE, while its operational updates show Jebel Ali cargo being connected through alternative gateways.

Fujairah

Fujairah's importance has risen sharply because of its position outside the Strait.

DP World has now agreed in principle with the Fujairah Ports Authority to develop two new terminals under a 50-year concession. The Al Rugaylat terminal is designed to handle up to 2.5 million TEUs annually, together with 1.7 million tonnes of general cargo and 190,000 car-equivalent units.

The development is strategically important because it turns a temporary workaround into potentially permanent infrastructure.

Khalifa Port

Abu Dhabi's Khalifa Port is another major alternative.

AD Ports Group reported that its ports handled 7.7 million TEUs in 2025, up 23% year-on-year. The new CMA Terminals Khalifa Port facility handled more than 1.3 million TEUs in its first year, reaching approximately 74% utilisation.

The wider Khalifa Port system is being expanded. CMA CGM and AD Ports agreed to increase the CMA terminal's capacity from 1.8 million to 2.7 million TEUs, taking total Khalifa Port container capacity to approximately 10.5 million TEUs.

AD Ports' Q1 2026 results already show the effect of the regional disruption: UAE container throughput declined 5% year-on-year, while variable concession fees from UAE container operations fell because of lower volumes at Khalifa Port.

So the shock is not confined to Jebel Ali.

Jeddah and Red Sea gateways are gaining strategic importance

DP World is also positioned to benefit from cargo that can be redirected toward the Red Sea.

Its Jeddah South Container Terminal handled more than 1.3 million TEUs in 2025, more than double the previous year's volume. The terminal's capacity has been increased from 1.8 million to 4 million TEUs, with a future capacity target of 5 million TEUs.

DP World's CEO said in March that the company expected its Red Sea terminals, including Jeddah and Sokhna, to see additional traffic as Gulf routes were disrupted.

This demonstrates one of DP World's biggest advantages during the crisis: it is not dependent on a single port.

Its global portfolio gives it the ability to redirect cargo between different geographical gateways.

But alternative ports cannot simply replace Jebel Ali

This is where the numbers become important.

Jebel Ali handled 15.6 million TEUs in 2025.

Khorfakkan's stated capacity is around 5 million TEUs.

CMA Terminals Khalifa Port currently has 1.8 million TEUs of capacity, with expansion to 2.7 million planned.

DP World's Jeddah terminal has capacity of 4 million TEUs.

The alternative network therefore has substantial capacity, but no single gateway can simply absorb Jebel Ali's entire lost volume.

The solution is consequently becoming multimodal rather than purely maritime.

Containers can discharge at Khorfakkan or Fujairah and move by truck or rail into Dubai. Maersk has already been operating landbridge solutions linking alternative UAE gateways with inland destinations, while DP World said that nearly 200,000 TEUs moved through regional overland truck and rail corridors during the two months preceding May 2026.

Shipping lines are redesigning their networks

The disruption is also changing carrier behaviour.

Maersk temporarily removed Jebel Ali from its Mesawa service because of the political and security situation and shifted the service to an alternative rotation, while continuing to provide alternative connectivity through other gateways.

Maersk's operational updates also show the growing importance of Khorfakkan, Fujairah, Jeddah, Salalah and Sohar as alternative routing points.

This is an important distinction for the UAE logistics industry.

The issue is no longer simply whether Jebel Ali can reopen normally.

It is whether shipping lines will restore their previous network structures once alternative routings, inland corridors and new terminal arrangements become commercially established.

DP World's biggest strategic response: move east

The clearest evidence that DP World sees the disruption as more than a temporary event is its decision to expand on the UAE's east coast.

The new Fujairah terminals will increase DP World's UAE container capacity from 19.4 million TEUs to almost 22 million TEUs once completed. Construction is expected to take approximately 24–30 months.

This effectively creates a second layer around the Jebel Ali ecosystem:

Jebel Ali → inland logistics network → Fujairah/Khorfakkan → Gulf of Oman

The strategy is not to abandon Jebel Ali.

It is to make the UAE logistics system less dependent on one maritime chokepoint.

What happens to DP World's 2026 financial performance?

The most important point is that DP World is much more diversified than Jebel Ali.

In 2025, the company generated $24.4 billion in revenue, but only part of that comes directly from container terminal operations at Jebel Ali. Logistics, freight forwarding, marine services, free zones and terminals across multiple continents provide significant diversification.

That diversification is why a 90–95% Jebel Ali volume decline does not translate into a 90–95% fall in DP World revenue or profit.

Nevertheless, the earnings pressure can be significant.

The company entered 2026 with:

• $24.4 billion revenue in 2025

• $6.4 billion adjusted EBITDA

• $1.96 billion profit for the year

• $3.1 billion invested in capex during 2025

• approximately $3 billion planned capex for 2026

• 93.4 million TEUs of global gross throughput

• 15.6 million TEUs at Jebel Ali.

That means the company is facing the crisis while simultaneously carrying a very large investment programme.

If the conflict lasts for much of 2026, lower UAE volumes could therefore be accompanied by higher contingency costs, rerouting expenses, lower asset utilisation and pressure on margins, even while DP World continues investing in new capacity.

The bigger risk: cargo may not fully return

The most important question for Dubai is not whether Jebel Ali eventually reopens.

It is how much of the cargo permanently changes its routing behaviour.

Once shipping lines establish reliable services through Khorfakkan, Fujairah, Khalifa Port, Jeddah or other gateways, customers may discover that they can operate through multiple gateways without relying exclusively on Jebel Ali.

That creates a potential structural change in Gulf logistics.

DP World's decision to build new Fujairah capacity reinforces this possibility. The company is effectively investing in insurance against future geopolitical disruption.

What the crisis means for Dubai's logistics model

Jebel Ali helped build Dubai into one of the world's major re-export and logistics centres because it combined:

Port + Free Zone + Warehousing + Customs + Road + Rail + Air + Regional distribution.

The current crisis does not destroy that model.

Instead, it exposes its biggest vulnerability:

Jebel Ali crisis: the numbers at a glance

The 90–95% annualised volume figures are mathematical illustrations based on Jebel Ali's 2025 throughput and should not be interpreted as a full-year 2026 forecast. The $700 million earnings impact is an external Moody's estimate for DP World at group level, not a reported Jebel Ali loss.

Conclusion

Jebel Ali is not being defeated by a lack of terminal capacity. It is being challenged by geography.

The port remains operational, but the Strait of Hormuz crisis has demonstrated how quickly geopolitical risk can remove access to one of the world's largest container gateways.

DP World entered the crisis after delivering 22% revenue growth and 32% profit growth in 2025. It now faces a potentially significant earnings setback at the same time as it invests billions of dollars in expanding its global network.

The most consequential development may therefore not be the temporary 90–95% collapse in Jebel Ali activity.

It may be the infrastructure being built in response.

Fujairah, Khorfakkan, Khalifa Port and Red Sea gateways are gaining strategic importance, while landbridge networks are connecting them back to the UAE's inland markets.

If those alternative corridors remain commercially viable after the crisis ends, the Gulf's container map could look permanently different—and Jebel Ali may emerge not as a replaced hub, but as one hub within a much more diversified UAE logistics network.